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CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS—THE RIGHT KIND OF
DETERRENCE?
Betty Joan Thurber *
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the many infamous corporate scandals that marked the early
2000s, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter “SarbanesOxley”).2 As a specific remedy for the perceived lack of strong corporate
governance and officer accountability that contributed to the downfalls of various
notable public companies, Sarbanes-Oxley dictates that public company Chief
Executive Officers (“CEOs”) and Chief Financial Officers (“CFOs”) must
personally certify their company’s financial statements.3 Stiff criminal penalties exist
for those who fail to make or err in making such certifications.4
1

While the certification requirements are intended, among other things, to
increase the personal responsibility of key executive officers for the corporation’s
financial disclosures and to deter corporate officials from fraudulently portraying
their companies’ financial goings-on, this portion of Sarbanes-Oxley may not well
serve its intended purpose. Specifically, the certification requirements may cause
otherwise qualified and suitable officers and directors to refuse or terminate service.
This comment investigates those two related contentions by reference to behavioral
psychology as well as legal research and scholarship. Part I begins with a brief
discussion of the major events that led to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. It then
compares and contrasts the “new” Sarbanes-Oxley officer certification requirements
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with similar officer responsibilities found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 as
amended (“Exchange Act”), as it existed before Sarbanes-Oxley. Part II defines and
examines selected concepts from the field of behavioral psychology as they relate to
matters of corporate governance and securities regulation. Part III synthesizes these
concepts with legal research and scholarship and draws related conclusions about the
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley’s certification requirements on corporate officers’
employment decisions.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
A. Events Leading Up to the Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley
The late 1990s will go down in business history as one of the greatest periods
of economic growth and technological development in the United States. Change
was widespread and included extensive use of the Internet in conducting business
transactions (resulting in many new computer-related industries and businesses) and
the explosion of the telecom market.6 Such exhilarating financial times “invariably
attract[ed] to investing millions of people who lack[ed] business knowledge, and to
business thousands of people who lack[ed] moral scruples.”7 These factors created
an economic climate in which actual successes were inflated and legal and ethical
constraints were all but ignored.8 As one commentator notes, “[t]he spirit of the
times over[came] the spirit of the rules.”9 In the spring of 2000, investors began to
realize that a financial bubble had developed and burst; stock market indexes
plunged, the market idled, and the general investor complacency of the previous
years began to wane.10 Then the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United
States caused massive insecurities across economic, political, and various other
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fronts; and increasing threats of war against Iraq fostered a pervasive and continual
unease throughout the business and investing communities.11
The “Big Four Frauds”12—Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest, and
WorldCom—came into the public light against this economic and historical
backdrop. Enron was accused of concealing its less-than-perfect finances with
special purpose entities and questionable (to say the least) accounting practices,
which resulted in the company filing for bankruptcy and causing billion dollar losses
for outside investors and company employees.13 Global Crossing was investigated
for using improper “swap deals” to exaggerate sales and was forced to seek
protection in bankruptcy.14 Qwest got the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(“SEC”) attention after it admitted to improperly accounting for over a billion
dollars in “swap deal” revenues.15 Finally, WorldCom confessed to overstating
profits and obscuring expenses of more than seven billion dollars, a gross
embellishment that caused the company to file the then-largest bankruptcy in United
States history.16
When Enron’s situation first began to unravel, President Bush and others
were able to attribute the debacle to “a few rotten apples.”17 However, as the
number of “rotten apples” appeared to increase with each corporate scandal, and as
these corrupt business practices moved to the forefront of the media, Congress
became subject to more and more pressure to respond to the cries for reform.18 The
result was Sarbanes-Oxley.19 President Bush claimed that its enactment would create
“a new ethic of personal responsibility in the business community.”20 More
11
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specifically, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee claimed that the
certification requirements included in Sarbanes-Oxley would “make CEOs directly
responsible for the integrity of their company’s financial statements….”21 In light of
these comments, Sarbanes-Oxley’s stated purpose is “[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures….”22 Whether or not
the law will achieve this objective still remains to be seen.
B. Officer Certification Requirements—Then and Now
One way to analyze Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy is to compare it to the
previous regulations. Certification as a means of securing accountability is not a new
concept. The Exchange Act requires each public company to file an annual report
on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q;23 “[b]oth of these reports
include financial information, management discussion, and analysis of that
information, as well as financial statements.”24 Before 1980, the law required only
the corporation to sign the Form 10-K.25 Post-1980 guidelines, however, require
that, in addition to the corporation, the CFO (or Chief Accounting Officer), CEO
(or Chief Operating Officer), and a majority of the board of directors must sign the
Form 10-K;26 the CFO and one other duly authorized officer must sign the Form 10Q.27 But do these pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Exchange Act requirements truly create
personal responsibility?
The fact that Congress included the certification
requirements within Sarbanes-Oxley indicates that legislators at least questioned
whether the previous signature requirements fostered the exercise and assumption of
adequate responsibility.
148 CONG. REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
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This Congressional uncertainty had a rational basis. The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
signature instructions require officers to sign periodic reports on behalf of the
corporation.28 These instructions, combined with the fact that officers’ signatures
appear next to (or above) their corporate titles, suggest that officers are not signing
in their individual or personal capacities and that it is the corporation that is actually
liable for the information contained in the reports.29 This argument, however, may
not carry much weight. Research into liability under the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
signature requirements indicates that “courts subject an officer who signs a periodic
report with knowledge of its inaccuracies to both primary and secondary liability.”30
Likewise, in certain jurisdictions, “an officer’s intricate involvement in, or knowledge
of, a fraudulent scheme subjects him to primary liability even when he does not sign
the fraudulent document at issue.”31
Regardless of the arguable similarities between the old and new regimes,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s new, more specific certification requirements “expand[ ] officer
responsibility to all of the periodic reports, and ties an officer’s inaccurate
certification to personal, criminal liability.”32 These certifications, however, do not
take the place of the signature requirements found in the Exchange Act; they are
additive and “represent an explicit acceptance” of a corporate officer’s personal
responsibility.33
In section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, “Congress sets the floor for the SEC’s
certification rules and establishes a framework for the internal monitoring
structures.”34 Under that section, the CEO and CFO must certify in each annual or
quarterly report that they reviewed the report, that the report “does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact,” and that the

28 Id. (citing General Instruction D to Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 31,102 at 22,06222,063 (Nov. 15, 2002); General Instruction G to Form 10-Q, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 31,031, at
22,023 (Nov. 15, 2002)).
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report and the financial statements therein “fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations” of the company.35
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley amends Title 18, Chapter 63 of the United
States Code and requires that a written statement by the CEO and CFO to
accompany each periodic report. That statement must certify that the report “fully
complies” with the requirements of the Exchange Act “and that information
contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations” of the corporation.36 Section 906 also provides
criminal penalties for noncompliance: a knowing violation potentially carries with it
a one million dollar fine and a prison term of ten years, and a willful violation may
result in a five million dollar fine and twenty years in jail.37
On the surface, then, the certification requirements found in Sarbanes-Oxley
appear to differ from pre-existing requirements in three key ways: “First, the new
certification makes officers personally liable for the documents they sign…. Second,
at least for CEOs, the certification extends liability to documents they did not
previously have to sign. Third, the certification provision clearly ties any violations
to criminal sanctions.”38 An impassioned discussion sparked among scholars and
practitioners alike in the wake of these new requirements; people wanted to know
whether the certification requirements (and the rest of Sarbanes-Oxley, for that
matter) were mere scare tactics or actual reform. While that question is not the one
specifically addressed in this article, a few assumptions seem fairly sound. SarbanesOxley’s certification guidelines close some significant interpretational loopholes
regarding executive officer liability, and they compel officers to pay attention to their
potential liability and their company’s financial and operating information in a
manner that the Exchange Act signature requirements did not.39 The direct threat of
criminal penalties, however, might be the most significant difference between
Sarbanes-Oxley and its predecessors. Because “businessmen and women want to
avoid jail at any cost,” they will be less likely to violate the requirements if there is “a
reasonable likelihood that they will go to jail rather than get probation, home
detention, or some other ‘alternative to incarceration.’”40
35
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III. DIGGING DEEPER
A. Why a Behavioral/Psychological Analysis is Instructive
Human behavior creates a need for and plays a significant role in many legal
issues. Only in the past two decades, however, have legal scholars focused on and
utilized behavioral research and analysis in their work.41 The materials are relatively
new, and behavioral investigations often stand in direct contrast to the more oftencited economic analyses.42 For many, however, legal analyses using behavioral
psychology provide welcome relief from, and a sharper analytical tool than, more
traditional modes of legal analysis, including economic analysis. Moreover, because
corporations are complex, hierarchical, multi-tiered organizations incorporating and
affecting numerous individuals and groups with various traits, an understanding of
human behavior and its relationship to rules and standards is likely to lead to
important observations about law, including legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley.
B. Risk Psychology—A Brief Background
Before delving into the precise contentions that either support or oppose the
hypothesis that Sarbanes-Oxley’s certification requirements will cause officers and
directors to refuse or terminate service, a general understanding of the psychology of
risk is helpful. While some may think of risk merely in terms of extreme activities
such as bungee jumping or skydiving, it is, in fact, a fundamental factor in almost all
human decisions. Most traditional definitions of risk involve “‘the possibility of loss
or injury’ or ‘a dangerous element or factor.’”43 In addition, the definition of risk
focuses on a lack of certainty and predictability.44 In all walks of life, decision

41See

Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998).
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making “involves choosing between alternative courses of action,” and risk is
inherent “in any course of action where the outcome is uncertain.”45
Every individual has a different tolerance for risk. Psychology scholars
disagree about whether risk tolerance originates from a person’s biological make-up,
his or her personality traits, various demographic and environmental factors, or a
combination of all of the above.46 Regardless of its origins, risk tolerance “can be
defined as the extent to which a person chooses to risk experiencing a less-favorable outcome in the
pursuit of a more-favorable outcome.”47 In that sense, risk tolerance measures on a
continuum “a trade-off…from minimizing unfavorable outcomes to maximizing
favorable outcomes.”48 If a person would rather minimize unfavorable outcomes, he
or she is probably risk-averse; on the other hand, if an individual consistently leans
toward maximizing favorable outcomes, he or she is likely a risk-seeker. In other
words, “[r]isk-averse people appear to be motivated by a desire for security, whereas
risk-seeking people appear to be motivated by a desire for potential. The former
motive values safety and the latter, opportunity.”49 Risk aversion, which places
higher value on security, is far more common in society.50 A risk-averse individual,
however, is not unaware of the factors that motivate a risk-seeking individual;
competing motivations exist to some extent in all people, “but with potential much
less important than security and aspiration for risk-averse people and security much
less important than potential and aspiration for risk-seeking people.”51
Despite the fact that most individuals tend to fall toward the risk-averse end
of the continuum, some studies have shown that educated people in professional
occupations, which may include corporate officers and directors, have increased risk
tolerance because they are more knowledgeable about the decisions they are making
and the consequences of those decisions, thus reducing the “fear of the unknown”
that may push people toward the risk-averse end of the spectrum.52 Will Sarbanes45 GEOFF DAVEY, THE INVESTMENT THINK TANK 334 (2004), available at http://www.riskprofiling.com/Downloads/Think_Tank.pdf.
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Oxley negate or mitigate that increased risk tolerance, or are corporate executives so
confident in their abilities that they will continue to be risk seekers? One cannot find
the answer to these questions merely by discussing the elementary conceptions and
terminology of risk. Rather, one must also consider the decision-making biases that
arise when dealing with cognitive psychology. Before delving into such biases,
however, one must first understand the larger psychological context into which they
fall.
C. Rational Choice Theory vs. Bounded Rationality
“At the most basic level, rational choice theory posits the existence of
principals who articulate ends that are beyond rational reproach.”53 Even more
simply, “rationality is understood as suiting means to ends….”54 There are various
conceptions of rational choice theory, differentiated by “how specific and precise the
predictions of the theory are.”55 More specifically:
On the left side of the spectrum are “thin” conceptions of rational
choice theory—that is, conceptions in which the theory is relatively
undemanding and in which it is relatively easy for the behavior of
actors to be consistent with the theory. On the right side of the
spectrum are “thick” conceptions of the theory—that is, conceptions
with more robust behavioral predictions that are more easily
falsifiable by empirical evidence.56
The thinnest version of rational choice theory is the “definitional version,” in
which “everything confirms the rationality of behavior, and nothing refutes it.”57 In
order of increasing thickness, there is also the “expected utility version” (economic
decision making is the result of some sort of cost-benefit analysis, whether explicit or
implicit),58 the “self-interest version” (if one can determine which course of action
53
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will result in the most benefits for the decision maker, one can predict the decision
maker’s course of action),59 and the “wealth maximization version” (decision makers
will always attempt to improve their financial welfare).60
Getting back to basics, rational choice theorists’ general contention is that
“each principal’s precise course of action should be predictable if we know her ends
in sufficient detail.”61 A great deal of behavioral science material, however, calls
nearly all of basic rational choice theory into question.62 Even more relevant is the
fact that “[n]one of the conceptions of rational choice theory discussed above is
optimal for the purpose of understanding how actors will respond to the incentives
that the law creates.”63 Thin versions of rational choice theory are useful for
observing behavior in reverse (in other words, by observing the ends, we can then
reason backwards to understand the means); however, these methods of analysis are
not helpful to legal policymakers, who “need to predict future behavior under
various legal scenarios, not merely understand past actions in hindsight.”64 Thick
versions of rational choice theory can be useful for legal policymakers because they
can “generate predictions about how actors will respond to alternative legal
regimes….”65 Evidence indicates, however, that decision makers often act
inconsistently with self-interest and base decisions on “norms that are often socially
constructed and sometimes evolutionarily adaptive.”66
Bounded rationality was born from this tension. Human beings are
inherently limited; therefore, “[t]o deal with limited memories we make lists. To deal
with limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.”67
Herbert Simon coined the term “bounded rationality,” which “captures the insight
that actors often take short cuts in making decisions that frequently result in choices
that fail to satisfy the utility-maximization prediction.”68 In other words, “[e]ven
59
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when the use of mental shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes.”69
These mental shortcuts and rules of thumb are commonly called biases and
heuristics, and they can have a significant impact on human decision making. For
the purpose of this article, there are certain biases that might be particularly visible in
an individual deciding whether or not to accept corporate executive employment.
D. Heuristics that Support the Hypothesis that Sarbanes-Oxley Certification
Will Deter Officers and Directors from Serving
1. The Availability Bias
This heuristic posits that individuals “tend to base [their] judgments of
frequency on ‘the ease with which instances of occurrences can be brought to
mind.’”70 In other words, in making decisions, people use the information that is
most readily available to them. When someone drives slower and more carefully
after seeing an automobile accident on the side of the road, or when someone makes
a doctor’s appointment after learning of a public figure being diagnosed with a
serious illness, the availability bias is at work.71
Tversky and Kahneman conducted an experiment involving the effects of
the availability bias in 1973; in the trial, subjects were asked to estimate the frequency
of occurrence of certain types of words.72 For example, when asked which were
more frequent in the English language, words “that start with the letter ‘r’ or have ‘r’
as the third letter, individuals tend to say the former, even though the latter are much
more common.”73 Just as it is easier to generate a word by knowing its first letter as
opposed to its third, and just as it is easier to recite the alphabet forward as opposed
to backward, it is easier to make judgments and decisions based on readily accessible
information. However, as was demonstrated in the Tversky and Kahneman

69

Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1477.

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1170
(2003) (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974)).
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experiment, decision making that too heavily incorporates the availability bias may
result in error.
How does the availability bias impact an analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
certification requirements? As mentioned in Part I, the government and the media
exposed significant corporate fraud and malpractice during the early part of the
twenty-first century. Shop talk became public scandal; reports that had been “buried
in the business section of top newspapers for years now became front-page news
everywhere and feature stories on broadcast and cable television shows.”74 In
addition to the extensive media coverage, the fact that the companies involved in
many of these scandals were considered longstanding, well-respected, household
names (for example, Rite Aid Corporation and Xerox Corporation)75 did not help the
growing perception that missteps in corporate governance could cause the demise of
even the most secure jobs and the most solid companies. When even the
perfectionist domestic diva Martha Stewart ended up in the line of fire for violations
of federal securities laws, the “average Joes” of the world began shaking in their
proverbial boots.
Despite the fact that some time has gone by since the passing of SarbanesOxley, it is fairly easy to see how the availability bias might come into play in terms
of potential officers and directors. Over the past few years, Americans have seen,
heard, and read about the criminal trials of a host of corporate executives. People
watched intently as Ms. Stewart was escorted to the correctional facility that would
be her not-so-lavish home for five months. When contemplating an offer of
employment as CEO or CFO of a publicly traded company, an individual would
certainly weigh the probability of winding up in a similar scenario. Depending upon
the individual’s risk tolerance, having vividly negative information so readily
accessible might discourage an otherwise qualified person from taking on executive
responsibilities. After all, “no one want[s] to be the next Enron.”76
2. The Vividness Bias
This heuristic is closely related to the availability bias. It theorizes that
individuals generally “perceive as more dangerous risks that are based on emotionally
interesting information rather than more probative abstract data.”77 Stated another
74
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way, people overestimate the probability and frequency of demonstrably intriguing
events, while they underestimate that of less interesting occurrences. This bias helps
to explain why certain individuals are more afraid of flying than driving: even
though a person is far more likely to be involved in a dangerous automobile accident,
stories about plane crashes are more emotionally compelling. Therefore, in making
decisions, people might overemphasize the likelihood of an airline crash and devalue
that of a more commonplace mishap.
The vividness bias could be important to a potential officer or director in
deciding whether or not to serve (although, of course, this subtle cognitive process
probably takes place without the individual’s conscious knowledge). An individual
might misinterpret the emotional tolls of the Enron era as a sign of probability of
reoccurrence. Proportionately, however, very few corporate executives face the
possibility of sanctions for violations of Sarbanes-Oxley or related laws and
regulations. Also, while those reading this article might understand that SarbanesOxley’s requirements differ only slightly from previous statutes in most regards (thus
indicating that conscientious executives need only “keep up the good work,” so to
speak), someone framing his or her employment decision based upon recent
disturbing events might be overinfluenced by his or her knowledge of the portion of
Sarbanes-Oxley that enhances criminal liability.
3. The Saliency Bias
Almost indistinguishable from the previous two biases, the saliency heuristic
involves the fact that “people tend to perceive as more dangerous risks that are
illustrated by colorful, dynamic or other distinctive stimuli.”78 Much like vivid risks,
the public generally overestimates salient risks (such as terrorism or cancer) because
they receive very broad media coverage.79
Just as with the availability and vividness biases, the overestimation of risk
that is inherent in the saliency bias could affect an individual contemplating executive
employment. For example, the sight of Adelphia Communications CEO John Rigas
being hauled away in handcuffs surely resonated in the collective memories of
American corporate executives, as would the vast amount of attention that the media
heaped upon the business world in general during the early part of the twenty-first
century. Such prominent and memorable images could certainly cause a candidate
for executive employment to overvalue the risks of serving.

78

Id.
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E. Heuristics that Oppose the Hypothesis that Sarbanes-Oxley Certification
Will Deter Officers and Directors from Serving
1. Cognitive Conservatism
Also known as “decision simplification,” this bias occurs as a result of busy
individuals (potentially including corporate executives) needing to process
overwhelming amounts of information in order to manage the chaos of their lives.80
Cognitive conservatism is a “bias against revision,” in which people “construe
information and events in such a way as to confirm prior attitudes, beliefs, and
impressions.”81
Motivationally, cognitive conservatism, though it occurs unconsciously,
serves to reduce stress.82 People have a tendency to build “positive schemas,” and
“[r]evising a schema is anxiety-provoking, especially if it opens up a host of troubling
possibilities.”83 Instead of dealing with the strains (whether they are intellectual,
emotional, physical, or psychological) of disconcerting scenarios and distressing
information, individuals subconsciously opt to minimize the threat of troubling
information by “dismissal or explanation in conformity with the existing schema.”84
Because cognitive conservatism causes people to ignore most risks (under this
theory, it takes a fairly significant risk to induce schema modification), “we can
predict that most managers will systematically underestimate external threats to
success.”85
Cognitive conservatism could be a significant influence on the decision
making of a potential corporate officer or director. Even though there are arguably
some increased risks associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements
(namely, stiffer criminal penalties for noncompliance than in previous regulations),
an individual who is intent on serving as an executive in a publicly traded company
80 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 135 (1997).
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might discount or overlook those risks altogether because they stand in the way of
his or her career success. He or she might also invoke a “but that would never
happen to me” frame of mind in order to incorporate the possible risks while
simultaneously discounting their probability, thus maintaining a positive schema. If
cognitive conservatism is heavily at work; only the most colorful, relevant, and
probable events will make it through the bar against revision.
2. Cognitive Dissonance
The cognitive dissonance theory predicts that, once a decision is made,
“attitudes and beliefs will shift to preserve consistency.”86
Also called
“commitment,” and a close theoretical relative of cognitive conservatism, cognitive
dissonance is tantamount to a psychological explanation for the familiar personality
trait of stubbornness; once a person takes steps toward a particular objective, the
likelihood of a change decreases greatly.87 Cognitive dissonance also accounts for
why salespeople commonly pester potential buyers until they give in; retailers and
sales representatives “know well that once a person takes a few steps toward some
purchase or deal, the likelihood of agreement increases.”88
In terms of the business world, “management literature strongly suggests that
once executives have committed to a course of action, their subsequent survey of
information is strongly biased to bolster their choice—especially when their choice is
public….”89 An individual who had already cognitively or emotionally committed to
serving as a corporate officer or director prior to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley is a
prime example of how cognitive dissonance might work. The individual has already
made a decision (to accept executive employment), and he or she will vehemently
resist any evidence that the decision was hasty, ill-advised, or just plain wrong.
Instead, he or she will search for (and, consequently, overemphasize) signs that the
decision was proper.
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3. Self-Serving Biases
The self-serving biases, which include the three related ideas of
overoptimism, overconfidence, and egocentrism, are “the loosest and least welldefined of the…biases that legal scholars commonly use, but they might be the most
important.”90
Overoptimism “consists of overestimating one’s capabilities,”
overconfidence “consists of overestimating one’s ability to predict outcomes,” and
egocentrism “consists of overstating the role that one has played in events in which
one has participated.”91
Self-serving biases, whatever form they may take, are familiar constructs;
whenever it is possible to do so, “people naturally ‘see what they want to see.’”92
People want to see “something that is in their self-interest, not a threat to either their
self-esteem or career prospects.”93 Therefore vast majorities of people, when
surveyed, display overoptimism in describing themselves as “better than average.”94
Research suggests that probability estimates for results are often miscalculated and
indicates that individuals tend to exaggerate their contributions to conversations
(examples of overconfidence and egocentrism, respectively).95 Despite the strong
correlation between these self-serving biases and general psychological welfare,96
individuals with strong self-serving biases do not live in a constant idyllic state of
unawareness.97 Rather, “[o]verconfidence in one’s own judgment magnifies the
undesirable consequences of erroneous judgment.”98
Self-serving biases are especially powerful in those “individuals [who] possess
some expertise.”99 How might such biases affect potential corporate executives?
Overoptimism could cause a person to unrealistically analyze his or her abilities in
90
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terms of, for example, attention to detail or time management (both are important
skills for officers and directors generally, and they are particularly crucial in terms of
Sarbanes-Oxley certification). Overconfidence might result in an individual
underestimating the probability that he or she will fail in various corporate duties,
thereby creating the all-too-common “not me” attitude of denial. Egocentrism could
generate the illusion in an individual that the company or organization could not live
without him or her, despite the obvious untruth and unreasonableness of that belief.
More generally, self-serving tendencies might cause a person to accept executive
employment regardless of the additional risks and challenges inherent in a postSarbanes-Oxley environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Just as the psychological impact of Sarbanes-Oxley’s certification
requirements cannot be determined from a brief discussion of risk-taking behavior,
neither can it be gleaned from broad-strokes coverage of various decision-making
heuristics and biases. Each individual is just that—an individual. Risk tolerance and
behavioral biases interact to different extents and with different results as the person
and the situation changes. For example:
The temporal interplay between initial overoptimism (leading one to
underestimate the risk of later dilemmas at the beginning of a course
of action) and the commitment bias [i.e., cognitive dissonance]
(leading toward continuation once those first steps are completed)—
an optimism-commitment “whipsaw”—is an especially interesting
explanation for why otherwise good people often find themselves
responsible for bad behavior.100
Although such behavioral analysis necessitates a case-by-case study to craft
any definitive answers, one may draw some general conclusions. One such
conclusion is that a major law such as Sarbanes-Oxley will have some influence on
the community it is meant to influence (namely, business professionals, whether they
are accountants, corporate attorneys, or officers and directors). Whether the effect
will be deterrence or arrogance depends on each individual’s risk tolerance and the
interaction among the various cognitive biases. It seems fairly safe to hypothesize
that if either of these two extremes—deterrence or arrogance—is the result of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the consequences will be short-lived; with many of the biases
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described in this comment, potency reflects the recentness and intensity of external
factors.
It will undoubtedly be intriguing to continue following corporate governance
during the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era and to note whether the law, combined with the
negative media attention garnered by certain key individuals, will deter fraudulent
practices in the business world or deter qualified people from joining the corporate
fold. Whether the world will witness another Enron or Martha Stewart is yet to be
seen. However, in terms of future lawmaking; good, constructive legal policy must
recognize behavioral science as an important consideration and respond to the
myriad cognitive processes that occur every day in each individual.
V. AFTERWORD
One of the primary tenets of legal education and scholarship is that the law
constantly changes. Even in the few months that have passed since the initial
completion of this article, new information has significantly impacted and helped to
develop the theories discussed in the previous pages. It would be extremely
cumbersome to detail every piece of relevant data; however, a few events and
contentions are worth comment.
Perhaps the most important and widely publicized addition to SarbanesOxley’s brief history is the recent acquittal of Richard M. Scrushy. In June of 2005, a
jury found the HealthSouth Corp. founder and CEO not guilty of 36 charges,
including one under Sarbanes-Oxley (specifically, the prosecution claimed that
Scrushy “‘willfully’ certified a securities filing in August 2002 that he knew to be
fraudulent”).101 Even before the verdict was official, Sarbanes-Oxley “was getting
mixed reviews from companies, lawyers and shareholders.”102 Most criticism
centered around the perceived imbalance between compliance costs and restoration
of investor confidence.103 Once the acquittal was announced, the floodgates of
criticism truly opened. The media claimed that the result of Scrushy’s trial “cast a
shadow on the Sarbanes-Oxley law in its first test”104 and that it was a “high profile
Chad Terhune, et al, Sarbanes-Oxley fails in first trip to the jury room, at
http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/print/GAM/20050629/RSARBOX29 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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failure for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”105 Legal commentators said that the “jury’s
rejection of the first attempt by the government to prosecute a top executive under
the law could cause prosecutors to tread more carefully in bringing such cases against
other CEOs”106 and that the jury’s failure to convict Scrushy under Sarbanes-Oxley
“means that ‘the utility of the criminal certification statute will be very much
undermined.’”107 Nonetheless, the lead prosecutor in the case averred that “[j]ust
because you have a not-guilty on Sarbanes-Oxley, it doesn’t mean the statute loses
any of its teeth.”108 The Justice Department remains “fully committed” to the
principles and enforcement of the law.109
More generally, recent literature indicates that CFOs are being pushed out
the door by the increased costs—both financial and otherwise—of regulatory
compliance.110 Many CFOs blame the rigorous demands of Sarbanes-Oxley for their
feelings of burnout and deflation. Thus it is not terribly surprising that “[t]otal
turnover among the CFOs of Fortune 500 companies rose 23% during 2004 from a
year earlier.”111 Financial officers seem to feel more like “‘numbers cruncher[s]’”
rather than “‘the chief executive’s consigliere,’” contributing to a decline in the
strategizing, advising, and just plain fun that may have originally drawn them to their
posts.112 Consequently, many CFOs are moving toward more operations- or
management-oriented positions, and some are ducking out of the publicly-heldcompany scene altogether.113
How do these new developments affect this article? More specifically, do
recent revelations make it more or less likely that professionals will be deterred from
serving as corporate executives? The Scrushy verdict, for example, may activate
some self-serving biases (particularly overconfidence) in corporate executives.
Consequently, individuals may jump to the conclusion that, because the HealthSouth
105
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leader was acquitted of all charges, the certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley
are a mere formality and no consequences will result from their ignorance or
malfeasance. On the other hand, the fact that many frustrated CFOs are deserting
their posts for less Sarbanes-Oxley-affiliated positions may indicate that the increased
appetite for risk once demonstrated by business professionals is waning in light of
complex and potentially damaging regulatory responsibilities.
One thing is clear—that nothing is clear. It is still unknown what overall
effect, positive or negative, the vast number of reform measures promulgated by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act have had on United States corporate boards and upper-level
business professionals. The law and its aftermath have forever changed the
corporate atmosphere, and it may take decades to truly understand and appreciate
the scope of such a major overhaul of business practice and procedure. While many
executives believe that their managements have been relatively unaffected by
Sarbanes-Oxley, a large percentage of industry insiders “believe the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act should be revisited by Congress to correct some of the act’s unintended
consequences.”114 Whether one of those unintended consequences is the deterrence
of qualified individuals from serving in executive capacities still hinges on complex
psychological processes that have yet to be fully explored in the context of corporate
law.
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